The Remuneration Committee (the committee) presents the following report for the 2019 financial year.
COMMITTEE GOVERNANCE
COMPOSITION
Members of the committee for the financial year under review were independent non-executive directors Harish Mehta (Chairman), Mike Hankinson and Phumla Mnganga. Their qualifications and experience are available here.
MEETINGS
The committee met formally three times during the financial year under review. Members’ attendance at meetings are recorded. The CEO attends meetings by standing invitation to make proposals and provide such information as the committee may require.
EVALUATION OF COMMITTEE
The committee conducted a self-assessment evaluation to measure its effectiveness and performance during the financial year under review. There were no concerns raised with the functioning of the committee nor with the efficiency and competence of its members. The next evaluation will be undertaken in 2021.
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The committee’s role and responsibilities are governed by its terms of reference as reviewed and approved annually by the board. As members of the committee, our mandate is to ensure that the company remunerates fairly, responsibly and transparently and in doing so annually reviews the company’s remuneration policy to ensure that it promotes the achievement of strategic objectives and encourages individual performance.
During the financial year under review:
- executive management engaged with shareholders regarding the company’s 2018 remuneration policy and implementation report, details of which are here;
- the committee reviewed, monitored, considered, recommended and approved (where applicable):
- the company’s remuneration policy and remuneration implementation report for approval by the board, which will be put to a non-binding vote by shareholders at the 2020 AGM;
- annual remuneration increases from employees outside the bargaining unit. An increase of 6.5% (2018: 4.0%) was mandated;
- annual remuneration increases for employees within the bargaining unit. An increase of between 6.5% and 7.0% (2018: 6.0%) was mandated;
- executive directors’ and Executive Management Committee members’ performance, remuneration and incentives bonuses;
- the annual award of shares in terms of the group’s long-term conditional share plan (CSP), details of which are below;
- the fees payable to non-executive directors for approval by shareholders. Details of which are below; and
- its terms of reference and annual work plan.
The committee is satisfied that it has fulfilled its responsibilities in accordance with its terms of reference, a copy of which can be found online.
SECTION 1 – BACKGROUND STATEMENT
Engagement with Shareholders
At the 2019 AGM of the company, our 2018 remuneration report was presented and voted on in sections, namely:
Remuneration policy – supported by 94.71% (2017: 95.66%) of the company’s shareholders who voted.
Remuneration implementation report – supported by 66.48% (2017: 89.97%) of the company’s shareholders who voted.
As a result of the dissenting votes on the remuneration implementation report, which exceeded 25%, management undertook a comprehensive review of SPAR’s executive remuneration framework and engaged with shareholders, proxy advisers and other stakeholders to understand their concerns around our remuneration policy and practice. Management has taken all comments on board in an effort to try and get the balance right between supporting shareholders’ interests, and appropriate performance-based remuneration, while at the same time motivating, incentivising and retaining our executive talent to implement SPAR’s strategy. Management:
- engaged with its major shareholders telephonically to understand and address their concerns;
- invited shareholders via a JSE SENS announcement on 8 October 2019 to email the Company Secretary with their concerns/questions. There were no comments received from shareholders; and
- engaged with the ISS who are a global company that provides corporate governance and responsible investment solutions, to discuss concerns raised in their 2019 advisory report, as management felt that shareholders may have acted on their recommendations to vote against the company’s 2018 remuneration implementation report.
Concerns raised by shareholders regarding the 2018 remuneration policy and remuneration implementation report are set out below:
Concerns |
Response |
|
Significant increases in the executive directors’ salaries. |
The remuneration of the CEO and Group Financial Director were benchmarked by using an appropriate reference group of peers in the market. These were not only similar retail businesses, but also companies of similar market capitalisation. In addition, the committee also considered the increased size of the company, not just in financial terms, but also its geographical expansion with related complexities and increased responsibilities. Finally, the committee took into account the strong reported profit performance of the company. The committee established that there was a significant gap which needed to be addressed through a market-related adjustment. The extent of the adjustment considered appropriate by the committee will be phased in over a period of three years. |
|
Restricted (non-performance) share awards granted, without performance conditions. |
The CSP scheme makes provision for the award of retention shares where remaining in the employment of the company for a period of three to five years is a performance obligation. The scheme provides for these awards to be made in “exceptional” circumstances. The committee recognised the significant number of senior and executive directors retiring during 2019 and 2020 and the importance that their designated successors and other identified key senior executives were retained. The risk of losing these key senior executives would be extremely detrimental to the company over this time. The committee therefore made awards of these “retention shares” to lock in identified key and critical executives. These awards will only be made when extraordinary circumstances, such as these, need to be addressed. |
|
Poor disclosure of CSP performance targets and performance against bonus metrics. |
Enhanced disclosure of CSP performance targets and |
|
The relative Total Shareholder Return (TSR) performance condition for the CSP allows for vesting to occur at performance levels below the average of the undisclosed peer group, with a large proportion (65%) vesting for performance equal to the comparator group. |
For the TSR award, the committee takes note of the concerns that an overly generous proportion will vest on the achievement of target. The vesting range is being considered by the committee and before any further awards are made, these will be reduced below the existing level and probably be in the range of 35% – 40% for on-target vesting. The details of the TSR peer group for performance measurement are set out in the remuneration policy. |
For the 2020 AGM, the remuneration policy and the remuneration implementation report will again be tabled separately for non-binding advisory votes by shareholders. In the event that either the policy or remuneration implementation report or both are voted against by 25% or more of the voting rights exercised, the committee commits to another engagement process to ascertain the reason for the dissenting votes and appropriately address any legitimate and reasonable objections and concerns raised.
CHANGES IN THE REMUNERATION POLICY
The committee considered developments in remuneration, best practice and feedback from shareholders and proposed the following changes to the remuneration policy:
- The adoption of a malus and clawback policy. The committee are in the process of confirming the policy but this will include at least the following provisions:
Malus |
Clawback |
|
The committee may, on or before the vesting date of an award, reduce the quantum of an award in whole or in part after an actual risk event (trigger event) occurs, which in the judgement of the committee, had arisen during the relevant vesting or financial period. |
The committee may apply clawback and take steps to recover awards that have vested in a participant (on a pre-tax basis) as a consequence of a trigger event which, in the judgement of the committee, arose during the clawback period. The clawback period will run for three years from the vesting date of the awards |
|
In the event of early termination of employment during the vesting period of an award, the committee will consider whether a trigger event arose between the award date and the date of termination of employment. |
In the event of a breach of directors’ duties by a participant, the committee reserves the right to pursue any remedies available to it in terms of the clawback policy, as well as common and statutory law. |
|
|
The policy will make provision for the implementation of certain methods of recovery in the event that the participant disposes of the shares after the vesting date but before the clawback period ends, as well as in the event that the shares are retained throughout the clawback period. |
The summarised trigger events for malus and clawback include:
- Employee misbehaviour, dishonesty, fraud or gross misconduct
- A material misstatement of the financial results for the performance or employment period of the award, resulting in an adjustment in the audited consolidated accounts of the company
- The assessment of any performance metric or condition (where applicable) in respect of an award which was based on error, or inaccurate or misleading information
- Any information used to determine the quantum of a cash short-term incentive or long-term incentive scheme payment, or the number of shares subject to a long-term incentive award was based on error, or inaccurate or misleading information, and/or
- Events or behaviour of the employee that had a significant detrimental impact on the reputation of the company
- Introduced a Minimum Shareholding Requirement (MSR) policy for executive directors. Refer below for details pertaining to the MSR requirements.
The committee is satisfied that remuneration in all forms accruing to employees at all levels is market related and equitably awarded. In addition, the committee believes that SPAR’s remuneration philosophy and policy supports the company’s strategic objects by incentivising both short-term and long-term behaviour to meet and exceed its strategic goals.
Thanks go to the members of the committee for their dedication and constructive contributions to the functioning of the committee.
Harish Mehta
Chairman of the Remuneration Committee
12 November 2019
SECTION 2 – REMUNERATION POLICY
PHILOSOPHY
SPAR’s employees are critical in achieving the company’s strategic objectives. Accordingly, SPAR is committed to paying fair, competitive and market related remuneration to ensure that the company is able to attract and retain top-quality and talented employees. Our remuneration policy therefore seeks to:
- position the remuneration levels appropriately and competitively in comparison with the labour market; and
- acknowledge the contribution of individual employees by rewarding them for the successful achievement of company goals and objectives.
Apart from fixed remuneration, an element of variable remuneration that is aligned to value creation in the form of short and longer-term incentive schemes is also catered for and linked to the achievement and performance of specified targets and objectives, with payment being made from increased returns. This also assists in attracting and retaining key employees.
Fair differentiation based on performance and skills shortage is applied. The company takes cognisance of its external environment through an understanding of national remuneration trends and by regular benchmarking against comparable companies and the market.
SPAR uses remuneration surveys conducted by reputable salary survey companies that have sufficient sample sizes and spread of positions, and an adequate representation in relevant industries comparable to SPAR.
Salary scales provide remuneration guidelines based on the Paterson grading system and are informed by market comparisons. The company strives to remunerate key positions and those positions where there is a shortage of skills (as defined annually) on at least the 75th percentile of the market, and the rest of the positions on at least the 50th percentile of the market.
The use of a performance management system also ensures that there is a positive correlation between individual and team performance and remuneration earned. Management is responsible for managing remuneration and thus supporting the long-term sustainability of the company.
Process to Determine Remuneration
The committee is responsible for approving salary increases for the executive directors and the Executive Management Committee.
The CEO, together with the Executive Management Committee, is responsible for all employees below EU grade. The overall percentage increase for employees below EU grade is authorised by the committee. Salary increases are implemented:
- on 1 January each year for all employees graded DU band and below, who are not members of the bargaining unit;
- on 1 October each year for employees graded EL band and above; and
- as per collective agreements with the union(s) for employees in the bargaining unit.
REMUNERATION STRUCTURE
SPAR’s remuneration structure consists of both fixed and variable remuneration using the Paterson grading methodology.
Fixed remuneration |
Variable remuneration | ||
Short-term incentives |
Long-term incentives |
||
Objective |
To help attract and retain the best talent. |
To motivate and incentivise delivery of performance, financial and non-financial, consistent with the group’s strategy over the financial year. |
To motivate and incentivise delivery of long-term, sustainable performance. |
Type |
Salary. |
Performance Bonus Plan. |
CSP. Share Option Scheme (Closed). |
Policy |
Based on the Paterson grading methodology and determined by level of skill and experience, and scope of responsibilities.* |
Solely at the discretion of the company and can be changed or withdrawn at any time. Short-term incentives are only paid to individuals who are in employ of the company at the end of the financial year. |
Annual or ad hoc awards approved by the board are granted to employees graded EL and above and identified selected other staff on merit. May be either performance or restricted awards. |
* The Paterson grading methodology works as follows:
F |
Chief Executive Officer |
EL and EU |
Executives |
DU |
High-level specialists/middle to high management |
D |
Management |
CU |
Lower-middle management |
C |
High-level skilled/clerical/supervisory |
B |
Clerical |
A |
Low-level skilled |
Fixed Remuneration
Fixed remuneration consists of cash remuneration, pensionable remuneration and benefits and is structured as follows:
Bands A to CU |
|
|
Bands D to F |
|
All permanent full-time employees are required to become members of one of the company’s available retirement funds, namely:
- The Old Mutual SuperFund Provident Fund: The SPAR Group Management Provident Fund;
- The Old Mutual SuperFund Pension Fund: The SPAR Group Ltd Defined Contribution Pension Fund; and
- The Old Mutual SuperFund Provident Fund: The SPAR Group Ltd Staff Provident Fund.
Membership of a medical aid scheme is voluntary. The company has a number of medical aid schemes which employees are entitled to join. The Tiger Brands Medical Scheme is a group scheme, while a number of other low-cost medical aids have been negotiated at distribution centre level.
Other variable remuneration, such as allowances, is paid where applicable and in accordance with the legislation and collective agreements entered into with the union(s) or workers’ committees.
Non-financial benefits include subsidised canteen meals, access to a clinic, uniforms and training and development.
Variable Remuneration
Short-term incentives
All employees participate in the short-term incentive scheme, as follows:
Bands A to CU |
Performance bonus of up to 50% of a month’s salary or part thereof, based on the achievement of set targets. The targets are based on key issues in the business strategy and are mainly financial targets. |
|||
Bands D to F |
Performance bonus, as follows: |
|||
Grade |
% of basic annual salary |
Bonus split |
||
EU to F |
100 |
75:25 |
||
EL |
60 |
60:40 |
||
DU |
30 |
30:70 |
||
DL |
15 |
30:70 |
The financial component of the short-term incentive is based on:
- a targeted divisional profit before tax for divisional management; and
- the group’s profit after tax for executive directors and central office management.
In both cases the financial target matrix threshold commences at profit achieved for the previous year (adjusted for extraordinary items if necessary), and increases incrementally until the maximum stretch achievement level is reached at a profit level approximately equal to the board-approved internal budget. On-target is set at approximately 97% of budget.
The methodology is based on the company’s approach in setting budgets that include sufficient stretch for management, and are not simply seen as an “easily achieved result”. For this reason the achievement of the budget presupposes an exceptional performance. This allows management to focus on all components of the budget throughout the year and to ensure these remain relevant.
The functional component comprises objectives that include corporate objectives (for example, transformation) and individual objectives, which are specific to a manager’s sphere of influence. The attainment of these targets contributes to the achievement of the company’s strategic objectives, which are aligned to the delivery of sustained shareholder value. The principle of paying for performance is a key factor underpinning the short-term incentive, and any variable payments are directly aligned to performance outcomes. Achieving these objectives will result in a bonus pay-out subject to the achievement of a minimum profit level of no less than the profit level achieved in the previous year.
Transformation is weighted at 60% of the functional allocation of 15% and addresses (1) the employment and promotion of black employees and (2) the development of black ownership.
The short-term incentive bonus is capped at 100% of annual salary for executive directors and senior general management.
Long-term Incentives
The company has two long-term incentive plans in place for key employees, senior management and executive directors, namely the Share Option Plan and CSP.
Share Option Plan (SOP)
The SPAR Group Ltd Employee Share Trust (2004) scheme closed in 2014 and no further share option allocations can be made in this scheme.
The SOP provided the right to the option holder to purchase shares in the company at the option price. On election by option holders, one third of the options granted vests after three years, with a further third vesting on the expiry of years four and five respectively. There is no performance criteria in this scheme and as the scheme is now closed, none can be introduced for previous awards.
The last options were allocated on 7 February 2014 and remaining participants have 10 years from date of issue to exercise their option rights. Based on the SOP rules, all awards under this scheme will lapse or vest by February 2024.
Options previously granted to executive directors, options exercised during the year under review and unexercised options as at 30 September 2019 are provided in the remuneration implementation report below.
CSP
The CSP provides a mechanism that enables the company to provide key employees with the opportunity to receive shares in the company based on personal or group performance. The primary intent is to make performance-related awards under the CSP through an award of shares that are subject to appropriate performance conditions. An award of restricted shares may be made in exceptional circumstances to address serious retention risks or to compensate prospective employees for the loss of long-term incentive awards with their existing employer.
The retirement of approximately 10 senior executives during the 2019 financial year caused the committee to seriously consider the need to retain the services of both internal replacements and external appointments for these positions. Accordingly, the committee decided to make certain awards of retention shares to identified key executives to “lock” them in to the company during this period of change. These were clearly understood to be extraordinary awards during 2018 and 2019 as the loss of any of our senior executives at this time would have been detrimental to our performance and the overall business.
It is not the committee’s intention to use restricted shares as an add-on award to retain or compensate executives during a year of poor performance.
The committee continues to review its compensation practices and may consider, as per global and local best practice, not to reward the executive team with time-based restricted shares.
The CSP is differentiated from the SOP in that it has performance conditions governing the vesting of awards. In addition, whereas the SOP is generally settled by the issue of shares, the CSP is intended to be settled by a market purchase of shares and will therefore not cause dilution to shareholders.
Salient features of the CSP remain as follows:
Details |
Conditional share plan |
|
Description |
Under the CSP, participants receive a conditional right to receive a share in the company on the vesting date and will have no shareholder rights prior to this date. |
|
Company limit |
The cumulative aggregate number of shares that may be allocated under the CSP shall not exceed 5 200 000 shares (approximately 3% of issued share capital). This limit excludes share purchases in the market and shares forfeited. The aggregate number of restricted shares that may be allocated under the CSP may not exceed 1 300 000 shares. |
|
Individual limit |
The cumulative aggregate number of shares that may be allocated to any one individual may not exceed 570 000 shares (approximately 0.33% of issued share capital). To prevent these numbers being exceeded, the annual awards are capped at a percentage of gross annual basic salary, for example, the CEO at 60%. |
|
Settlement method |
The intention of the company is to settle all CSP awards from a market purchase of shares; however, the rules of the CSP do allow for settlement in any of the following ways:
|
|
Termination of employment |
Bad leavers will forfeit all awards on the date of termination of employment. In the case of good leavers, a pro rata portion of all unvested awards will vest. The pro rata portion will reflect the number of months served since the award date and the extent to which the performance conditions (if any) have been met. The balance of the awards will lapse. |
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Allocation methodology |
The CSP may be used for annual allocations. The company will define annual allocation levels expressed as a percentage of gross annual basic salary. In defining these levels, the company will endeavour to maintain the fair value that participants would have maintained under the SOP. To this end, allocation levels that may be made on an annual basis (expressed as a percentage of gross annual basic salary) are as follows: CEO: 60% |
|
Grant price |
Not applicable |
|
Vesting/employment period |
The scheme rules set this at three years for annual award of performance shares and in equal parts after years three, four and five for restricted shares. Prior to vesting, executive directors may elect to subject settled shares to an additional holding period of three years. |
Performance conditions
The performance conditions applicable to an award of shares are set annually by the committee, in broad consultation with shareholders. The performance conditions will be measured over a performance period of three years, which is aligned with the financial years of the company.
The table presented below summarises the three performance conditions along with their definitions, and the proportion of the total number of shares awarded to which the performance conditions relate. Also included in the table is the target levels for the Threshold, On-target and Stretch measures which represent the levels of achievement required for certain portions of the performance shares related to that particular performance condition to vest. The targets remain unchanged from those approved by shareholders on 11 February 2014 when this scheme was initiated.
Performance Condition |
Defined as |
Detail |
Threshold |
On-target |
Stretch |
Weighting |
Return on net assets (RONA) |
Operating profit expressed as a percentage of the net closing asset value at the relevant year-end. |
The average RONA over the performance period will be compared to the targets set out herewith. |
80% of the on-target. |
The average RONA as per the operating budget approved by the board for each financial year in the performance period. For the 2019 award, this was set at an average of 40%. |
120% of the on-target. |
30% |
HEPS |
Headline earnings divided by the weighted average number of ordinary shares (net of treasury shares) in issue during the relevant financial year. Headline earnings consist of the earnings attributable to ordinary shareholders, excluding non-trading and capital items. |
Growth in HEPS will be calculated as the growth between the base year and the last year in the performance period. |
Consumer price index (CPI) growth over the performance period. |
HEPS growth between the operating budget approved by the board for the last year in the performance period and the base year HEPS. For the 2019 award, this was set at 30% growth. |
Target plus 9% over the performance period. |
50% |
Total shareholder return (TSR) relative to a peer group |
The TSR will be measured as the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) in the TSR index for the company and the peer companies over the performance period after holding the shares and reinvesting the dividends over the performance period. |
To remove vagaries in the market, the CAGR in TSR calculation is to be smoothed by using the average TSR index for the 20 business days up to and including the start of the performance period and 20 business days up to and including the end of the performance period. The peer group will constitute suitably constructed and appropriate peer companies. |
80% of the on-target. |
Weighted average TSR of peer group. The committee recognises the concern that this is overly generous and before any further awards are made, this will be reduced below the existing level and probably be set in the range of 35% – 40% for on-target vesting. The relative stretch vesting would then be increased to 175% of the on-target measure. |
120% of the on-target. |
20% |
The peer group for purposes of the TSR measurement are:
- Shoprite Holdings Limited
- Pick n Pay Stores Limited
- Woolworths Holdings Limited
- Massmart Holdings Limited
- Cashbuild Limited
- Clicks Group Limited
and remain unchanged.
The portion of the performance shares that will vest at each target will be as follows:
Performance |
Vesting Percentage |
|
Threshold |
Acts as a “gatekeeper” and will represent the minimum performance that is required before performance shares vest. |
30% of the award of performance shares will vest for performance at threshold. None of the performance shares will vest for performance below threshold. |
On target |
Relates to good, but sufficiently stretching performance. |
65% of the award of performance shares will vest for performance on-target. For the TSR award, the committee recognises shareholders’ concern that the award percentage is possibly overly generous. Before any further awards are made, these will be reduced to below the existing level and probably be set in the range of 35% – 40%. |
Stretch |
Relates to exceptional performance in the context of the prevailing business environment. |
100% of the award of performance shares will vest for performance at stretch. |
For performance levels between threshold and stretch, linear interpolation is used to determine the proportion of shares vested.
The performance conditions of the CSP continue to be reviewed in line with best practice.
The Remuneration Committee supports shareholding by its executive directors and believes this re-enforces shareholder alignment post the vesting of long-term incentives. To this end, executive directors can elect to subject their CSP shares that are coming up for vesting for a further agreed holding period during which time such shares cannot be disposed of. All executives have agreed to further hold their shares for an additional three years.
The committee plans to introduce a MSR policy which will apply to executive directors. The policy will require the executives to build up a specific shareholding in SPAR using shares from various sources, including (but not exclusively or limited to) the vesting of awards under the CSP.
The target minimum shareholding to be built up by executives would be:
- CEO – 200% of total guaranteed package; and
- other executives – 150% of total guaranteed package.
In terms of the MSR policy, executives will hold their shares to the earlier of:
- three years; or
- the date of his or her termination of employment with any of the SPAR employer companies; or
- the abolishment of the MSR policy; or
- upon his or her successful application to the committee in special circumstances as governed by the MSR policy, which may include proven financial hardship.
The shares that have vested are settled and held by an escrow agent. Executives are prohibited to trade with the share freely until the end of the holding period but will be treated as a normal shareholder and will be able to vote and receive dividends paid by the company in respect of the shares.
CURRENT CSP AWARDS
Performance conditions, targets, information and allocations
The interim measures against the targets for the unvested awards issued in 2016, 2017 and 2018 are summarised in the table below. The projected HEPS growth and average annual RONA returns over the appropriate performance periods for each applicable grant have been calculated using historical and forecast HEPS values and are provided purely for shareholders’ information.
Description |
2016 |
2017 |
2018 |
Grant date |
15 November 2016 |
14 November 2017 |
14 November 2018 |
Vesting date |
7 February 2020 |
8 February 2021 |
14 February 2022 |
Performance period |
1 October 2016 to |
1 October 2017 to |
1 October 2018 to |
HEPS condition |
|||
Threshold (expected CPI growth) |
14.80% |
14.20% |
14.17% |
On-target growth (based on approved budget) |
30.00% |
30.00% |
30.00% |
Stretch growth |
39.00% |
39.00% |
39.00% |
Base year HEPS measure | 1 033.0c | 976.0c | 1 063.2c |
On-target HEPS required | 1 342.9c | 1 268.8c | 1 382.2c |
Management forecast based on current projections | 1 134.9c | 1 309.1c | 1 385.9c |
Expected HEPS growth (management forecast based on current projections) |
9.9% |
34.2% |
30.4% |
Rona condition |
|||
Threshold (80% target) |
32.00% |
32.00% |
32.00% |
On-target RONA (average for 3 years) |
40.00% |
40.00% |
40.00% |
Stretch |
48.00% |
48.00% |
48.00% |
Base year RONA measure | 45.8% | 39.3% | 39.1% |
On-target RONA required | 40.0% | 40.0% | 40.0% |
Management forecast based on current projections |
39.9% |
41.1% |
42.6% |
The measure of TSR will be the TSR of SPAR relative to the weighted average TSR of the six selected peer group companies.
Awards made during 2019
On 12 February 2019, the committee awarded 281 500 performance shares (2018 grant) and 100 000 restricted (retention shares) (2018 grant) to key employees, senior management and executive directors. The vesting date of the performance shares award is 12 February 2022 and the vesting dates of the retention shares are 12 February 2022, 12 February 2023 and 12 February 2024.
The performance targets for both the HEPS and RONA conditions are set out in the table above (see column headed 2018). Also included in the table are management’s current forecasts of the achievement levels for both conditions.
These performance shares were calculated in accordance with the targeted award level at a share price of R173.38.
Details of CSP awards to executive directors are provided in the remuneration implementation report below.
Awards that vested during 2019
On 18 February 2019 the second tranche of CSP awards issued in November 2015 vested. The final performance conditions for the grant were measured and externally verified by Deloitte. The results of the calculation of the actual vesting percentage were as follows:
|
HEPS growth over performance period |
Vesting percentage |
Revised vesting percentage |
Weighted |
|||||
Threshold |
On-target |
Stretch |
Actual |
||||||
HEPS Condition |
16.82% |
30.00% |
39.00% |
13.10% |
0.00% |
28.38%* |
14.19% |
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|
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|
RONA growth over the performance period |
Vesting percentage |
Revised vesting percentage |
Weighted |
|||||
Threshold |
On-target |
Stretch |
Actual |
||||||
RONA Condition |
36.00% |
45.00% |
54.00% |
41.35% |
50.80% |
50.80% |
15.24% |
||
|
Compound annual growth rate |
Vesting percentage |
Revised vesting percentage |
Weighted |
|||||
Threshold |
On-target |
Stretch |
Actual |
||||||
TSR Condition |
0.20% |
0.26% |
0.31% |
5.01% |
100.00% |
100.00% |
20.00% |
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|
|
|
|
|
|
Total to vest |
49.43% |
The committee adjusted the HEPS measurement for the 2019 vesting tranche to recognise the additional equity shares issued in 2016 which were not taken into account when the growth target was originally set. These 11.9 million additional ordinary shares, constituting approximately 6.9% of issued shares, were placed in March 2016 to raise funding for inter alia the Swiss business acquisition. The adjustment took into account the extent of dilution caused to HEPS growth due to these additional shares.
Of the total number of awards in effect at the measurement date, 149 036 vested.
The awards were settled by a market purchase of shares.
The actual vesting awards for the last two years were as follows:
2019 |
2018 |
|
HEPS growth |
28.38% |
51.10% |
RONA growth |
50.80% |
53.20% |
TSR |
100.00% |
100.00% |
Final vesting |
49.43% |
61.50% |
Executive and Non-Executive Directors’ Remuneration
The committee makes use of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ (PwC) executive and non-executive remuneration reports to provide insight into current remuneration practices and trends and continually engages with PwC to assist them with a benchmarking exercise of salaries, including looking at short-term and long-term incentives in order to ensure that the remuneration of executive management is fair and responsible in the context of overall employee remuneration. The committee is satisfied that PwC are independent and objective in giving their advice.
Executive directors’ remuneration
Executive directors receive a monthly salary and benefits based on the role of each executive and his or her performance and contribution to the group’s overall results, including other pensionable remuneration, allowances such as a car allowance, pension fund, medical aid, vehicle insurance and fuel, which is paid by the company.
Details of executive directors’ remuneration for the year under review are provided in the remuneration implementation report below.
Executive directors’ terms of service
Executive directors are full-time employees of the company and, as such, each has an employment agreement in accordance with the company’s standard conditions of service, but with a notice period of two months (versus one month for other employees) and more comprehensive confidentiality undertakings. The CEO has a notice period of three months.
Non-executive directors’ remuneration
Non-executive directors are not full-time employees of the company and, as such, each has a contract for services and not a contract of employment. Non-executive directors’ remuneration consists of a fixed basic fee and is not linked to the financial performance of the group, nor do they receive share options or bonuses.
Details of non-executive directors’ remuneration for the year under review are provided in the remuneration implementation report below.
Management recommends non-executive directors’ fees, based on industry benchmarks, to the committee for onward recommendation to and approval by the board who in turn recommends the fees to shareholders for approval in accordance with the Companies Act. Non-executive remuneration increases are implemented on 1 March each year and their proposed fees for the period 1 March 2020 to 28 February 2021 are as follows:
Current |
Proposed |
Increase |
|
Board directors |
|||
Chairman (including his participation in all committees) |
1 410 000 |
1 620 000 |
14.9 |
Member |
445 000 |
470 000 |
5.6 |
Audit Committee |
|||
Chairman |
225 000 |
263 000 |
16.9 |
Member |
110 000 |
127 000 |
15.5 |
Risk Committee |
|||
Chairperson |
130 000 |
155 000 |
19.2 |
Member |
90 000 |
110 000 |
22.2 |
Social and Ethics Committee |
|||
Chairperson |
130 000 |
151 000 |
16.2 |
Member |
90 000 |
99 000 |
10.0 |
Remuneration Committee |
|||
Chairman |
130 000 |
151 000 |
16.2 |
Member |
90 000 |
98 000 |
8.9 |
Nomination Committee |
|||
Chairman |
130 000 |
146 000 |
12.3 |
Member |
90 000 |
98 000 |
8.9 |
The committee reviewed the fees for non-executive directors against the Institute of Directors Non-Executive Directors’ Fees Guide and PwC’s Non-Executive directors: Practices and remuneration trends report in terms of percentile and reference group. The latter consists of a group that is comparable to SPAR in terms of market capitalisation. The remuneration of SPAR directors showed a significant lag which was addressed through a market adjustment. The committee further recognised that directors’ fiduciary duties and obligations have expanded significantly following SPAR’s geographic diversification. Board members have to exercise governance and compliance oversight over a broader spread of countries and businesses, with an associated increase in levels of care and due diligence. This has resulted in directors taking on a more demanding role with greater complexity and responsibility.
In aggregate, non-executive directors will receive an 13.62% increase (2018: 19.91%).
Non-executive directors’ terms of service
The notice period for non-executive directors is three months with an age limit of 70 years. The board may at its discretion extend a non-executive director’s retirement date.
SECTION 3 – REMUNERATION IMPLEMENTATION REPORT
The remuneration implementation report contains the detailed information and figures pertaining to the application of the remuneration policy in relation to executive and non-executive directors.
Executive Remuneration
The policy for executive directors’ remuneration is summarised below.
The remuneration of the CEO was benchmarked by using an appropriate reference group of peers in the market and the committee established that there was a significant gap which was addressed through a market-related adjustment.
The adjustment further recognised SPAR’s significant geographical expansion from South Africa into Ireland, Switzerland, Sri Lanka and Poland. These new territories increased the scope of the CEO’s international responsibility and contribute to the complexity of the business. As a result, the CEO’s role encompasses a much broader span of control and management, with an increase in reportees and accountabilities.
The committee also took cognisance of the CEO’s role as the Chairman of SPAR International which is beneficial to the SPAR group’s international standing, reputation and ability to identify new growth opportunities.
The Group Financial Director’s effective basic salary increase in 2019 was 10.1%, however this was influenced by the timing of his increase in the 2018 calendar year. His actual increase received for the 2019 financial year was 4.0% and in line with the group mandate.
In aggregate, executive directors received an 8.65% increase (2018: 11.68%). Excluding the effect of the increase made to the CEO’s remuneration, discussed earlier, the average increase for the remaining executives was 5.1% and in line with the general level of salary increases.
Directors’ remuneration
R’000 |
Salary |
Performance- |
Retirement funding contributions |
Travel allowance |
Share option gains |
Total |
Emoluments |
|
|
|
|
|
|
2019 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Executive directors |
|
|
|
|
|
|
GO O’Connor |
6 735 |
6 525 |
787 |
545 |
|
14 592 |
WA Hook |
3 407 |
1 599 |
427 |
1 467 |
|
6 900 |
MW Godfrey |
4 451 |
4 267 |
528 |
533 |
1 509 |
11 288 |
R Venter |
3 185 |
3 000 |
400 |
924 |
|
7 509 |
Total emoluments |
17 778 |
15 391 |
2 142 |
3 469 |
1 509 |
40 289 |
2018 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Executive directors |
|
|
|
|
|
|
GO O’Connor |
5 850 |
4 374 |
687 |
468 |
|
11 379 |
WA Hook |
3 407 |
1 747 |
425 |
474 |
14 037 |
20 090 |
MW Godfrey |
4 042 |
3 022 |
481 |
476 |
1 589 |
9 610 |
R Venter |
3 063 |
2 236 |
384 |
1 360 |
2 694 |
9 737 |
Total emoluments |
16 362 |
11 379 |
1 977 |
2 778 |
18 320 |
50 816 |
1 | The performance-related bonuses relate to amounts earned in the current year. |
2 | Other benefits include medical aid contributions and a long service award. |
EXECUTIVE SHORT-TERM INCENTIVES
The short-term incentive policy is summarised above. For the executive directors, the breakdown of the targets, relative bonus caps as a percentage of annual salary and the average pay-out for the 2019 financial year, were as follows:
Bonus cap (% of annual salary) |
Executive directors’ average performance achievement % |
|
Group financial results |
75 |
87.50% |
Transformation targets |
10 |
68.80% |
Key performance |
15 |
88.83% |
Total |
100 |
83.47% |
The table below shows the annual bonus payments to each of the executive directors in respect of the performance achieved in 2019.
Annual performance bonus achieved 2018/19
|
Maximum |
Actual |
Actual |
|
|
|
|
Director |
|
|
|
GO O’Connor |
100.00 |
96.88 |
6 525 |
WA Hook |
100.00 |
46.94 |
1 599 |
MW Godfrey |
100.00 |
95.88 |
4 267 |
R Venter |
100.00 |
94.18 |
3 000 |
Average achievement |
|
83.47 |
|
Performance bonus scorecard
Weighting |
Achieved as a % of maximum |
Actual |
Payout |
|||
Threshold |
On-target |
Stretch |
Performance measure |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Group financial |
|
15.00% |
80.00% |
100.00% |
|
|
Profit after tax, adjusted for exceptionals |
75% |
R2.11 billion |
R2.20 billion |
R2.30 billion |
R2.34 billion |
75.00% |
Strategic scorecard |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Transformation objectives |
10% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
5% |
|
50% of all management positions filled |
|
8/20 |
1.66% |
|
5% |
|
Weighted points awarded for stores owned by equity groups, with bonus points if Stretch exceeded |
|
31.33/30 |
5.22% |
Other measures |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Personal objectives |
15% |
|
|
|
|
15.00% |
Profit after tax, adjusted for exceptionals
In 2018/19, profit after tax increased by 18.4% to R2.16 billion but was positively impacted by certain financial liability measurements. Management has consistently adjusted for these and reported a normalised profit after tax in order to provide meaningful comparisons, and have based the dividend declaration on this adjusted profit. The normalised profit i.e. profit after tax, adjusted for exceptionals, for the reporting year increased by 9.9% to R2.34 billion in an extremely competitive grocery retail environment and represented an exceptional result.
Employment equity management appointments
To achieve the group transformation objectives, management has been challenged to fill at least 50% of all available management positions (graded DL to EU) with equity candidates. During the current financial year 20 positions were identified at the group’s head office and eight of these were successfully filled with designated managers. This was particularly disappointing in the DU positions but management remain committed to this objective.
Enterprise development – store ownership
Management has been strategically focused on developing equity ownership within the South African retail formats and this objective awards points on a weighted format basis, to all stores owned by designated groups. This has been an extremely pleasing result as reported ownership increased to 153 stores, an increase of 13.3% in the year.
Personal objectives
The executive directors’ personal objectives are fundamentally set to drive strategic initiatives. Each agrees a minimum of three personal objectives with the committee and these are generally equally weighted but may be adjusted to recognise more significant matters. The broad objectives and achievements of the executive directors in the 2018/19 year were;
GO ‘Connor |
|
|
|
|
Score achieved |
100.00% |
|
|
|
|
|
MW Godfrey |
|
|
|
|
Score achieved |
93.33% |
|
|
|
|
|
WA Hook |
|
|
|
|
Score achieved |
80.00% |
|
|
|
|
|
R Venter |
|
|
|
|
Score achieved |
82.00% |
Executive Long-Term Incentives
SOP
The SOP closed in 2014 and no options have been allocated since 7 February 2014. There is no performance criteria in this scheme and as the scheme is now closed, none can be introduced.
Options held over shares in The SPAR Group Ltd
|
Date of option issue |
Option price Rand |
Number of options held |
|
2019 |
2018 |
|||
Executive directors |
|
|
|
|
GO O’Connor |
07/02/2014 |
124.22 |
50 000 |
50 000 |
Total |
|
|
50 000 |
50 000 |
WA Hook |
10/11/2009 |
66.42 |
50 000 |
50 000 |
|
08/12/2010 |
99.91 |
50 000 |
50 000 |
|
08/11/2011 |
96.46 |
55 000 |
55 000 |
|
13/11/2012 |
122.81 |
60 000 |
60 000 |
Total |
|
|
215 000 |
215 000 |
R Venter |
08/11/2011 |
96.46 |
11 800 |
11 800 |
|
13/11/2012 |
122.81 |
30 000 |
30 000 |
|
12/11/2013 |
126.43 |
30 000 |
30 000 |
Total |
|
|
71 800 |
71 800 |
MW Godfrey |
10/11/2009 |
66.42 |
– |
12 000 |
|
08/12/2010 |
99.91 |
25 000 |
25 000 |
|
08/11/2011 |
96.46 |
35 000 |
35 000 |
|
13/11/2012 |
122.81 |
30 000 |
30 000 |
|
12/11/2013 |
126.43 |
30 000 |
30 000 |
Total |
|
|
120 000 |
132 000 |
Total options held by directors | 456 800 | 468 800 |
Options exercised |
Date of |
Number of |
Option price |
Market |
Gain |
MW Godfrey |
27/09/2019 |
12 000 |
66.42 |
192.19 |
1 509 |
CSP
The CSP policy is summarised above.
Details of unvested CSP awards held by directors
|
Award |
Share price |
Number of shares |
|
2019 |
2018 |
|||
Executive directors |
|
|
|
|
GO O’Connor |
09/02/2016 |
180.11 |
|
20 000 |
|
07/02/2017 |
183.55 |
14 600 |
14 600 |
|
07/02/2018 |
190.25 |
30 700 |
30 700 |
|
12/02/2019 |
190.21 |
33 100 |
|
Total |
|
|
78 400 |
65 300 |
WA Hook |
09/02/2016 |
180.11 |
|
7 500 |
|
07/02/2017 |
183.55 |
7 500 |
7 500 |
|
07/02/2018 |
190.25 |
13 000 |
13 000 |
|
12/02/2019 |
190.21 |
15 800 |
|
Total |
|
|
36 300 |
28 000 |
R Venter |
09/02/2016 |
180.11 |
|
9 600 |
|
07/02/2017 |
183.55 |
7 500 |
7 500 |
|
07/02/2018 |
190.25 |
15 000 |
15 000 |
|
12/02/2019 |
190.21 |
20 800 |
|
Total |
|
|
43 300 |
32 100 |
MW Godfrey |
09/02/2016 |
180.11 |
|
11 000 |
|
07/02/2017 |
183.55 |
9 000 |
9 000 |
|
07/02/2018 |
190.25 |
17 500 |
17 500 |
|
12/02/2019 |
190.21 |
20 800 |
|
Total |
|
|
47 300 |
37 500 |
Total directors’ interest in the CSP |
|
|
205 300 |
162 900 |
Details of vested award shares held by directors
In line with the Remuneration Committee’s view that senior executives should be exposed to the share price post the vesting of their long-term incentives, the following executives have elected to subject their CSP shares to a further agreed upon holding of three years.
|
Award date |
Total number |
% |
Total |
2018 |
|
|
|
|
GO O’Connor |
17/02/2015 |
36 665 |
61.50 |
22 548 |
WA Hook |
17/02/2015 |
14 000 |
61.50 |
8 610 |
R Venter |
17/02/2019 |
22 000 |
61.50 |
13 530 |
MW Godfrey |
17/02/2019 |
22 000 |
61.50 |
13 530 |
2019 |
|
|
|
|
GO O’Connor |
09/02/2016 |
20 000 |
49.43 |
9 886 |
WA Hook |
09/02/2016 |
7 500 |
49.43 |
3 707 |
R Venter |
09/02/2016 |
9 600 |
49.43 |
4 745 |
MW Godfrey |
09/02/2016 |
11 000 |
49.43 |
5 437 |
Non-Executive Directors’ Remuneration
The policy for non-executive directors’ fees is summarised above.
R’000 | 2019 |
2018 |
Fees for services as non-executive directors |
|
|
MJ Hankinson (Chairman)b |
1 385 |
1 319 |
MP Madi |
213 |
498 |
M Mashologua |
544 |
515 |
HK Mehtaabc |
848 |
805 |
P Mngangabd |
741 |
704 |
CF Wellsacd |
875 |
831 |
AG Wallerac |
631 |
358 |
LM Koyana |
185 |
|
Total fees |
5 422 |
5 030 |
a | Member of Audit Committee. |
b | Member of Remuneration and Nomination Committees. |
c | Member of Risk Committee. |
d | Member of Social and Ethics Committee. |
Executive and Non-Executive Directors’ Interests in the share capital of the company
Number of shares |
2019 |
2018 |
Directors’ interests in the share capital of the company |
|
|
Executive directors |
|
|
GO O’Connor – direct beneficial holding |
53 634 |
22 986 |
WA Hook – direct beneficial holding |
77 817 |
74 110 |
MW Godfrey – direct beneficial holding |
18 967 |
13 530 |
R Venter – direct beneficial holding |
18 275 |
13 530 |
Non-executive directors |
|
|
MJ Hankinson – held by associates |
2 800 |
2 800 |
HK Mehta – direct beneficial holding |
2 000 |
2 000 |
HK Mehta – indirect beneficial holding |
10 000 |
10 000 |
CF Wells – direct beneficial |
1 100 |
1 100 |
AG Waller – direct beneficial |
3 200 |
3 200 |
As at the date of this report the directors’ interests in the share capital of the company remain unchanged.
Declaration of disclosure
The company enters into transactions in the ordinary course of business with certain entities in which directors CF Wells and GO O’Connor, or their direct family members, have a significant influence. These interests are in the form of shareholdings in food service and retail entities and are disclosed in an annual declaration of directors’ interests to the company. The transactions between these entities and the group were insignificant in terms of the group’s total operations for the year. Other than that disclosed above and in note 37 in the annual financial statements, no consideration was paid to or by any third party, or by the company itself, in respect of the services of the company’s directors, as directors of the company, during the year ended 30 September 2019.